I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that during the rapid economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s Japan's private and public sectors invested heavily without proper considerations for protecting the environment. Pollution levels increased and there was resulting irreversible damage to the natural environment. In addition serious health prob-Ž . lems arose from the pollution, such as the Minamata disease mercury poisoning and severe asthma due to polluted air in the cities of Kawasaki and Yokkaichi. These pollution-caused health problems attracted increasing public attention in the late 1960s. In response to such environmental degradation and damage, and the resulting public outcry, the Japanese government introduced the Basic Law for Ž . Ž . Environmental Pollution Control 1967 and the Air Pollution Control Law 1968 both of which turned out to be ineffective in controlling environmental damage.
Significant improvement in the environment began only in the early 1970s when a series of amendments to these Pollution Control Laws and some additional laws including the Cost Allocation of Public Pollution Control Works and the Punishment of Environmental Pollution Crimes Relating to Human Health were enacted Ž w x . see 20 for an empirical examination of the effects of these regulations .
Another significant factor, which contributed to the abatement of Japan's environmental damage, was the significant oil price increases due to the first and second oil shocks in the 1970s. Japanese government policy to promote global competitiveness of the Japanese industry in the midst of rising energy costs resulted in a massive effort, financial and otherwise, to encourage Japanese firms to shift their investment to less energy-consuming areas and to rapidly deploy energy-saving production equipment. Such energy-saving equipment was often found to be less polluting.
For example, the Japanese pulp industry was mainly responsible for most of the organic pollution of the Inland Sea, which was on the verge of an irrecoverable w x decline in 1970 26 . The pulp industry was forced by law to reduce the amount of the waste discharged as effluent to one-fifth of the previous level within 2 years Ž . and to 1r20 within 7 years. Their response was to replace the sulfite pulp SP Ž . production process used up to then with a new kraft pulp KP process. The KP process is not only environmentally cleaner but also more energy-saving since it can utilize the organic wastes from pulping as an energy source. Japanese industry's investment in pollution control and energy-saving devices increased from a small percentage of total investment in plant and equipment in the late 1960s to its peak of 20% in 1975, and then gradually declined to a small percentage in the mid 1980s, with an average of above 10% for the 1970s. The corresponding figures for the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, and w x Sweden in 1974 are considerably smaller at 3.4, 2.7, 2.3, and 1.2%, respectively 26 . This led to the general agreement that the Japanese industry was successful in at least partially ''decoupling'' environmental degradation and economic growth, proving that ''environmental policies and economic growth policies can be not only Žw x . compatible but indeed mutually supportive'' 28 , pp. 95᎐96 . In fact, in the 1970s through 1980s, Japan achieved the highest economic growth rate among the G7 countries while reducing SO and NO emissions at the highest rate among the 2 x w x OECD members 28 .
Discovering win᎐win solutions to environmental problems requires a proactive w x search for innovative solutions and significant investment in R & D 30 . Not surprisingly many firms consider such investment, if not mandated by regulation, to be highly risky and inconsistent with profit maximization.
The importance of the relationships between environmental performance and profit maximization objectives within a firm's management process cannot be 1 w x overstated. We concur with Rugman and Verbeke 32 that the key question at the firm level is whether specific resource commitments expressly intended to achieve environmental performance may simultaneously improve industrial performance.
In responding to the energy crises during the 1970s and early 1980s Japanese firms were highly successful in turning energyrenvironmental challenges into opportunities for profit making. 2 Given their past success in responding to market-generated threats and opportunities, it is of considerable interest to analyze Japanese firms' organizational responses to contemporary environmental demands being imposed by Japanese as well as foreign governments, non-governmental and civil organizations, and citizens' groups. In addition to meeting some minimum standards of environmental protection, these new demands include increased commitment to constant improvement of environmental performance levels through such activities as environmental monitoring, formal reporting, and validation of environmental performance by independent agencies. Some scholars suggest that contemporary Japanese firms may be merely reacting to the greening trend in some of their export markets while North American and w x European firms are following proactive green strategies. Roht-Arriaza 31 , for example, suggests that Japanese firms' primary interest in obtaining ISO 14001 Ž . certification was to penetrate the European Union's EU trade barriers. Indeed, a 1992 survey of firms reports that no Japanese firm in the survey associates publication of environmental reports with enhancing a firm's competitive advantage, compared to 6 and 18% of North American and European firms, respectively w x 7 .
There is, however, anecdotal evidence that some Japanese firms have placed environmental protection high in their priorities. For example, Sony set up their corporate Environmental Council in 1976, chaired by the C.E.O., and actively sought to improve its corporate environmental performance globally.
Sony obtained its first ISO14001 certification in May 1995 for one of its subsidiaries. The number of Sony plants and subsidiaries that have acquired ISO 14001 certification exceeded 30 by February 1997 and exceeded 90 by September 1998. A section chief in the Environment Department of Sony, which obtains about 70% of its sales revenues from outside Japan, believes that it has successfully institutionalized its investment process in the environment within its business w x planning system and hence that Sony's environmental activities are sustainable 34 . Many other Japanese firms are pursuing ISO 14001 certification. As of September 1 Firm's environmental responsibility may be part of a firm's social responsibility but no generally acceptable definition of corporate social responsibility has emerged yet. For example, profit maximization and the resulting payment of corporate income taxes is an integral part of a firm's social w x w x responsibility 21, 39 . Horiuchi 14 discusses Japanese firms' organizational reactions to global warming. 2 The major motives for Japanese innovations in this domain were the significant increases in Japan's energy cost due to the oil shocks in the 1970s, which changed the input factor price ratios faced by Japanese manufacturers in favor of the adoption of less-polluting energy-saving equipment. See also w x Hayami et al. 12 for a description of Japanese firm's more recent efforts to develop technologies for reducing the emissions of gases causing global warming.
1999, the number of ISO 14001-certified plants in Japan was 2,400, surpassing w x 3 second-place Germany's 1400, third-place U.K.'s 1009, and the U.S.'s 490 15 .
The objective of this study is to explain the significant variation that exists in environmental protection behaviors of Japanese manufacturing firms. In particular Ž . we focus on i the factors that led Japanese manufacturing firms to formally institutionalize their environmental protection commitments and those that led Japanese manufacturers to incorporate environmental goals in their decision Ž . processes; ii the characteristics of firms associated with achieving ISO 14001 Ž . certification; and iii the characteristics which explain early adoption of environ-Ž . mental certification. We postulate and test in this study two classes of models: 1 Ž . models which are based on profit maximization; and 2 models which are based on utility maximization. The latter recognize agency relationships and postulate that, in addition to profit maximization, attitudes and perceptions of executives may motivate action.
One characteristic that distinguishes Japanese firms from North American firms Ž . is the presence of various types of corporate groups keiretsu to which Japanese firms belong. There is some evidence that keiretsu group firms share business information and sometimes make joint investment and other business decisions. It is possible that such group behavior facilitates greening of Japanese firms. We investigate this hypothesis by including certain keiretsu-related variables in our econometric specifications.
Section II presents our models and data. In doing so we relate specifications of our models to earlier empirical models in the literature. Section III presents and discusses our estimation results. Section IV provides concluding remarks.
II. MODELS AND DATA

Models
Analysis of Japanese manufacturers' responses to contemporary environmental concerns is of considerable interest because it is often thought that, despite their rapid adoption of energy-saving equipment in the 1970s and the 1980s, their 3 The ISO 14001 is an international, voluntary standard for environmental management systems, Ž . published by the International Organization for Standardization ISO , an international standard-setting w x body 33 . In 1990, the ISO and the Business Council for Sustainable Development, composed of business leaders from around the world, had discussions about standardization related to environmental management. As a result of those discussions, in the next year, the ISO established a Strategic Advisory Ž . Group for the Environment SAGE . Discussions in the SAGE resulted in the start-up in 1993 of an Ž . ISO Technical Committee TC207 , whose task is ''standardization in the field of environmental management tools and systems.'' In 1996, the ISO accepted ISO 14001, ''Environmental management systemsᎏspecification with guidance for use,'' as its formal international standard. This standard specifies the requirements of an environmental management system for organizations in any industry or field, such as manufacturing, service, nonprofit, and governmental organizations. Those requirements Ž . Ž . Ž . include five steps in an environmental management system: 1 environmental policy, 2 planning, 3 Ž . Ž . implementation and operation, 4 checking and operation, and 5 management review. Those steps must be recorded properly. An organization can self-declare that it is ISO 14001-compliant. But in our analysis, we deal only with ISO 14001 certifications certified by third parties. A caveat is in order. The ISO 14001 is a standard of environmental management systems not of environmental performance. Therefore, the ISO 14001 should not be interpreted as an indicator of ''good'' environmental performance, such as low pollutant emissions or energy efficiency. current reactions to domestic and global environmental issues are less proactive than their North American and European counterparts. For example, when the European Union introduced its ISO certification standards in quality and then in environmental management, Japanese firms were originally reluctant in seeking these certifications. 4 There are many studies which have analyzed the determinants of U.S. firms' w x decisions on environmental issues. DeCanio and Watkins 5 , for example, estimate the determinants of over 9000 U.S. firms' decisions to participate in the Green Lights program, one of several voluntary pollution prevention programs initiated by Ž . the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPA , and find that firm-specific variables such as firm size, earnings, and insider shareholding are significant Ž w x determinants of U.S. firms' voluntary participation in these programs see also 6 for similar findings with respect to the role of firm performance in the participation . 5 decision, using different methodologies .
In two studies, one with some 300 and the second with 6000 U.S. firms, Arora w x and Cason 2, 3 investigate firms' participation decisions in 33r50, also an EPA voluntary program which encourages firms to voluntarily reduce releases and transfers of 17 toxic chemicals, and find that firm size and industry effects are particularly important determinants of firms' participation decisions. One important difference between the Green Lights and 33r50 programs is that each deals w x with different types of technology equipment. DeCanio and Watkins 5 note that firms' decisions to invest in energy-efficiency technologies covered by Green Lights are less firm-and industry-specific than technologies to reduce pollution associated with the toxic chemicals specified by 33r50. w x In Canada, Henriques and Sardorsky 13 have studied the determinants of a firm's formulation of an environmental plan. Their empirical results showed that customer, shareholder, government regulatory, and community group pressures positively influenced the formulation of environmental plans. Negative influences included lobby group pressures and firms' sales to asset ratios. The perceived importance of environmental issues was also associated with increased probability of having a plan. Firms in the natural resources sector were more likely to have a plan than those in manufacturing and services sectors.
In our study we explore the determinants of organizational commitment to environmental protection objectives. We identify three levels of commitment. At the most basic level an organization can identify environmental objectives and institutionalize such objectives formally. Such formal commitment represents a Ž . firm's visible but not necessarily implemented or implementable resolve to cope with the environmental protection demands. A higher level of commitment sees environmental policy integrated into general corporate policy and practices receiving support from organizational members, especially from the top executives of the organization. The commitment can deepen further by the institution of a monitored process of continuous improvement of environmental protection validated by 4 Companies and government agencies in the EU introduced requirements for ISO 9000 certification w x of quality on foreign exporters and the domestic firms 31 . Japanese firms originally reacted negatively to such a quality certification arguing that their products already have high quality standards. The EU requirements prevailed. 5 Other voluntary programs include 33r50 and Energy Star programs. Firms joining these voluntary programs do not get any break in the degree of environmental regulations imposed by EPA but they are able to take advantage of EPA's technical expertise, among other benefits.
third-party certification. This stage involves an externally visible commitment to environmental objectives, the monitoring of performance, and the assessment of achievements. It requires allocation of resources and attainment of continuous improvement of environmental performance. We have postulated nine models which explain organizational environmental efforts in terms of variables reflecting these three levels of commitment to Ž environmental protection objectives formal derivation and specification of each . model are given in Appendix B .
We have postulated two classes of models to explain four dependent variables. One class of models is based on simple profit maximization and thus involves variables that affect the costs and benefits that accrue from the particular level of environmental commitment. The second class of models recognizes organizational agency relationships and thus incorporates variables that may affect the utility of managers and their behavior, in addition to variables reflecting profit maximization.
The first two models explain the degree of institutionalization of environmental Ž . policies FORMAL POLICY . Two other models explain the degree to which the formal policy is integrated into general corporate policies and receives support Ž . from its top management POLICY INTEGRATION . Three models explain the probability that the organization will choose to obtain a third-party environmental Ž . certification specifically ISO 14001 certification . The last two models explain the propensity for early adoption by a firm of ISO 14001 certification.
In the profit maximization models postulated, the independent variables that Ž . explain environmental commitment include: firm size FIRM SIZE , profitability Ž . Size FIRM SIZE may determine the capacity of the organization to take w x action in the presence of economies of scale 23, 27 . Certification involves some significant fixed costs. These costs are less significant for larger organizations than for smaller ones. The impact of size upon the institutionalization of environmental objectives may involve two contradicting forces. On the one hand, larger organizations may find it more difficult to reach a consensus about values and actions while, on the other hand, the larger organization may already possess specialized 6 Civil society's pressure affects firms' environmental behavior in various ways. For example, local communities can exert pressures on polluting firms to change their behavior without any help from the w x government 29 . skills that can facilitate formulation of environmental commitments and their integration into organizational policies and practices. The net direction of impact, Ž however, is left as an empirical question in these models. Profitability PROFIT-. Ž . ABILITY and debt ratio DEBT RATIO influence the costs of capital and financial flexibility. Profitable organizations are more likely to pursue environmental objectives. We also postulate that firms with lower short term debt have more flexibility to finance new programs; however, such a proposition is less certain since the debt ratio may reflect rational responses to tax laws or other variables that affect capital structure. We expect that the significance of the impact will increase with the increase in the level of commitment. The more export oriented the Ž . organization is EXPORT RATIO , the higher the benefits it may accrue from the more visible actions taken to protect the environment. Since foreign customers may have less chance to monitor the performance of a company or have knowledge about its actions and intentions, they may demand more visible signs of commitment of environmental protection. We expect companies with high export ratios to be more inclined to validate their environmental protection by obtaining a certification that is internationally recognized. Similarly, formal institutionalization of environmental policies may accrue more benefits to exporters than to domestically oriented firms, whose customers may have more direct ways of assessing the firms' environmental performance.
It is generally thought that the relative sizes of intangible assets, such as goodwill Ž . Ž . ADVERTISING , knowledge capital R & D , and other management capabilities that firms own have high correlations with firms' capacity and incentives to cope successfully with the contemporary environmental issues many manufacturers face w x 10, 32 .
Firms with significant advertising expenditures are likely to have stronger contact with final consumers and other external stakeholders and hence are more likely to internalize environmental values held by the public. Firms with high R & D expenditures are more likely to be able to find technological solutions to their environmental problems. Such firms are also likely to be more innovative and less resistant to change.
One special characteristic of Japanese firms is the presence of various types of Ž . corporate groups keiretsu and other interfirm relationships, which do not exist in Ž w x . the U.S. see, for example, 1, 24, 25 . Our models include two types of Japanese interfirm relationships. First we include dummies representing whether or not a sample firm belongs to the President's Club of one of the six major bank-based Ž . Ž keiretsu groups KEIRETSU DUMMY . These banks are Mitsubishi now Tokyo-. Ž . Mitsubishi , Sakura formerly Mitsui , Sumitomo, Fuji, Sanwa, and Daiichi-Kangyo Banks. It is possible that being a member of such a keiretsu group has systematic effects on firms' dealing with environmental issues. Another business group variable we use is the equity share owned by a sample firm's largest bank lender called Ž . ''main bank'' MAIN BANK OWNERSHIP . While the member firms of each of the above six major bank-based keiretsu groups all have their keiretsu bank as their main bank, there are also many other firms which are not members of President's Clubs and yet have one of these six major banks as their main bank. We include the percentage of equity held by the main bank of each firm in our models to see the impact of such main bank᎐client firm relationships on environmental behavior.
If these keiretsu relations serve interfirm information exchange purposes as is w x often argued 1 , then we do not know a priori the direction of keiretsu relations' contributions to the pursuit of environmental protection. On the positive side, keiretsu firms' environmental skills can be strengthened by mutual interfirm technology transfers. On the other hand, it is possible that keiretsu firms discuss and develop successfully legal means and know-how to cope with government and civil society pressures, thus relieving them of the need to increase their commitment to environmental protection. It is also possible to interpret Japanese keiretsu relations as representing a form of insider shareholding. If this is the case, it is possible that the impact of keiretsu relations on environmental responses is w x negative for Japanese firms, as was found by DeCanio and Watkins 5 for U.S. firms.
We have also included in the model a foreign ownership variable Ž . FOREIGN OWNERSHIP . Foreign owners may, on the one hand, be less willing to contribute to the social welfare of the country and thus less inclined to invest in environmental protection above the level required by regulation. On the other hand, it is possible that foreign owners must secure goodwill from regulatory authorities in host countries to prevent discrimination and do so by intensifying their environmental protection efforts.
INVESTMENT IN PLANTS represents opportunities for environmental improvement embodied in new machinery and equipment. Higher investment levels in plants may improve environmental performance and reduce external pressures for a deepening organizational commitment.
Ž . Lower average age in a company EMPLOYEE AGE may reflect a higher learning capacity of organizational members, since younger employees are generally more trainable, adaptive, and less resistant to change. Consequently, companies with younger employees may accrue lower costs of implementing environmental policies or obtaining certification.
We also incorporated in the models which explain participation in ISO 14001 Ž . participation in ISO 9000 ISO9000 series certification of quality management systems. Participation in ISO 9000 is likely to reduce the information search and learning costs involved in implementation of ISO 14001 because both systems are based on similar processes and ideas of system improvement and certification.
In deriving the utility maximization models we have postulated that in addition to pursuing profit maximization, managers of the firm are likely to undertake Ž . higher levels of environmental commitment 1 if they personally place high value Ž on the environment and its protection e.g., feeling that human interference with Ž . nature can produce disastrous consequences EARTH SPACESHIP and that Ž . . Ž . people must seek harmony with nature HARMONIOUS COEXISTENCE ; 2 if they are pressured by civil society or the government to do so in the form of Ž criticisms, threats of loss of legitimacy, and other sanctions. CIVIL SOCIETY . Ž . PRESSURE, GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ; 3 if they feel that their firms are in control of the situation and can solve their environmental protection problems Ž . Ž . CONTROLLABILITY ; 4 if they accept the legitimacy of corporate environmen-Ž tal responsibilities e.g., agreeing with the polluter pays principle and accepting that responsibility for environmental damage should be extended to those who . use natural resources even if they do not directly damage the environment Ž . Ž . POLLUTER PAY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY ; 5 if they accept their own and Ž . their firm's responsibly to protect the environment RESPONSIBILITY .
Data
We have used several sources of published data for the financial, economic, and environmental variables. These include the Japanese Ministry of International w x Trade and Industry web site 22 and Japan Accreditation Body for Conformity w x Assessment's web site 17 for ISO 14001 and ISO 9000 series membership, respectively. Financial and economic firm-specific data were collected from various w x Japanese company data books 35, 36 and also from the Japan Development Bank financial database.
To obtain information about the formal institutionalization of environmental objectives as well as information about attitudes and perceptions of managers, we have conducted a survey using a structured questionnaire. One executive from each firm was asked to fill out the questionnaire. Specifically, the questionnaire was Ž . designed to obtain information about 1 environmental commitments at the firm Ž . level; 2 managers' attitudes toward the relationship between mankind and the Ž . Ž . natural environment; 3 institutional and social pressures; 4 managers' confi-Ž . dence in their personal and their firms' ability to manage environmental issues; 5 Ž . the principles used in management of firms' environmental affairs; and 6 managers' attitudes toward their personal and their firms' responsibilities for protecting Ž the environment. The survey used a Likert-like five-point scale from 1 s''strongly . 7 disagree'' to 5 s''strongly agree'' .
The questionnaires were sent in May, 1997 to 600 Japanese manufacturing firms which were randomly selected from all manufacturing firms listed in the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 8 By the end of August, 1997 we got back Ž . usable responses from 193 firms response rate s 32% . These responses were then matched to firm-and industry-specific information on financial, economic, and environmental characteristics. The definition and derivation of all variables are Ž provided in the following section Appendix A provides the descriptive statistics for . these variables .
A. Financial, Economic and En¨ironmental Variables
A-1. Dependent¨ariables. We use two environment-related behavioral variables as dependent variables. The first identifies whether or not a particular firm has at least one of its plants certified for ISO 14001. 9 This binary variable, ISO DUMMY, is used in our probit models. The second variable, TIME TO ISO, is the amount Ž . of duration time in months that had passed between the first Japanese certification of ISO14001 and the first certification for our sample firms. The duration time for the firms in our sample that have no ISO14001 certified plants is right-censored. Ž . We use this variable in our duration survival time analysis. 7 Original items are found in Appendix C. 8 This survey was conducted in cooperation with Professor Kanji Yoshioka and his research group at the Keio Economic Observatory of Keio University. 9 Some of our sample firms received BS 7750 certifications, which were similar to ISO14001
certifications. BS 7750 certifications were subsequently converted to ISO 14001. All certifications of our sample firms, including those ''converted'' ones, were given for their ''sites'' inside Japan. Therefore, we can conclude that the certifications of our sample firms were not directly motivated by regulations in EU.
A-2. Independent¨ariables. For each of our sample firms, the following firmspecific economic and other variables are calculated as mean values for fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996 .
FIRM SIZE is the number of employees the firm has. PROFITABILITY is calculated as the ratio between a firm's current before-tax profits and sales revenue. 10 DEBT RATIO is calculated as the ratio between a firm's current debts and total assets. EXPORT RATIO represents the percentage of export in total sales value. Relative size of customer goodwill is represented by a proxy, ADVER-TISING, calculated by firms' advertising expenditures divided by firms' sales revenues. 11 Relative size of knowledge capital is represented by a proxy, R & D, calculated as firms' R & D expenditures divided by firms' sales revenues. To control for sectoral impact upon the firm's relative sizes of advertising and Ž knowledge capital, industry dummies are used. These dummies are defined in . Appendix A.
KEIRETSU DUMMY indicates whether or not a firm belongs to the President's Club of one of the six major bank-based Keiretsu groups. MAIN BANK OWNERSHIP is calculated as the percentage of shares owned by a firm's main bank. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is calculated as the percentage of shares owned by foreign shareholders. INVESTMENT IN PLANT is derived as the ratio between a firm's annual investment in facility and total fixed assets. EMPLOYEE AGE represents the mean age of a firm's employees.
Ž . Participation in ISO 9000 series certification ISO9000 was included as a dummy variable of whether the firm obtained quality management system certification, ISO 9000 series certification. 12 
B. Variables Deri¨ed from Sur¨ey Responses
Since responses to survey questions are subjective and idiosyncratic, reflecting the respondent's interpretation of each question, we have used factor analysis to derive indicators representing attitudinal and perceptual variables in our models. Factor analysis simplifies a set of correlated variables by finding a smaller number of appropriate linear combinations of the variables so that those linear combinaw x tions would represent well the variations of the original variables 11, 18 . Combining responses to different questions reduces idiosyncratic errors and redundancy in 10 w x It is known that accounting profits are not equal to economic profits 9 . In analyses not shown in this paper, we replaced the accounting profit rates with market returns, and found that the replacement does not change our results significantly.
11
Ž . These variables R & D and ADVERTISING reflect many aspects of the firm and the industry sector other than the aspects of knowledge capital and goodwill. In fact, industry structure may influence both variables. Even though we tried to eliminate potential spurious relationships by including control variables such as industry dummies, we cannot completely deny the possibility of identifying such relationships. 12 The diffusion of ISO 9000 series certification precedes the launch of ISO 14001. Therefore, we treated the variable representing ISO 9000 series certification as an exogenous variable. Indeed, exclusion of ISO9000 variable does not change our results significantly.
survey responses. Using factor analysis with Varimax rotation the following factors were derived.
13 B-1. Dependent¨ariables. The first group of rated items dealt with internal commitment of the firm to environmental objectives. Two factors were derived. FORMAL POLICY measures the degree to which the firm has developed and formally institutionalized policies on the environment. POLICY INTEGRATION measures the degree to which the firm has integrated its environmental policies into general corporate policies and practices and the degree that these policies receive top management support.
B-2. Independent¨ariables. The second group of rated items focused on managers' perceptions of the relationship between the natural environment and mankind. Two factors were derived. EARTH SPACESHIP measures the degree of vulnerability that the respondent attributes to our planet as a consequence of mankind impacts. HARMONIOUS COEXISTENCE measures the degree of the respondent's belief that mankind must live with nature in a harmonious way.
The third group of rated items dealt with the pressures that government and nongovernmental organizations and groups are perceived to place upon firms to improve their environmental performance. Two factors were derived. CIVIL SOCIETY PRESSURE and GOVERNMENT PRESSURE, which mea-Ž sure the pressures the firm faces from civil society e.g., pressures from environ-. mental groups, the mass media and the pressures the firm faces from the government and the general public.
The fourth group of rated items explored the degree to which the firm is perceived by its managers as able to control its impact on the environment. One factor was derivedᎏCONTROLLABILITY.
The fifth group of rated items explored perceptions of general principles that should govern environmental management in society. Two factors were derived. POLLUTER PAY and ENERGY EFFICIENCY, which measure acceptance of the principle of responsibility of polluters to pay the full cost of any environmental damages they caused and the acceptance of the principle of penalizing firms which use energy-inefficient equipment.
The sixth group of rated items focused on perceptions of the executives' of their personal responsibility and that of the firms to protect the environment. One scale was derivedᎏRESPONSIBILITY.
Appendix C gives the results of the factor analysis. 13 The factor scores obtained from the factor analysis are used in OLS and probit regressions and in survival analyses to follow. We extracted factors whose eigenvalues were larger than one. We used Varimax normalization as our axis rotation method when more than one factor was obtained. Missing values which resulted from no responses or responses corresponding to ''Don't know'' were replaced with the sample mean values. We interpret the obtained factors according to their factor loadings with respect to each question. The factor scores for all 193 firms were calculated using the factor loadings. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
14 The models based on utility maximiza-Ž Ž . Ž . . tion Models 1-2 and 1-4 explained about 29 and 20% of the variation of FORMAL POLICY and POLICY INTEGRATION, respectively. Table II reports the results of probit regressions in which the dependent variable is set to one if a firm has at least one plant which is ISO 14001-certified and zero otherwise. 15 Table  III reports on their predictive powers. Both profit maximization based models and utility maximization based models provided accurate predictions for a majority of the cases in each cell with overall accuracy ranging from 85% for the profit Ž . maximization based models Table III-1 and 88% for the utility maximization Ž . based models Table III-2 . Table IV provides the results of the Cox proportional Ž . hazard models. The dependent variable was the time elapsed in months between the first ISO 14001 certification in our sample firms and the certification of the particular firm. All models were significant. 16 
Profit Maximization Based Models
Three variables are significantly correlated with the degree to which Japanese manufacturing firms formally institutionalized their environmental objectives Ž Ž . . Model 1-1 in Table I Table I , confirming the expectation that firms which invest in knowledge assets are more likely to have the sophistication to articulate and formalize their environmental policies. The two business network Ž . variables MAIN BANK OWNERSHIP and KEIRETSU DUMMY were also significantly positively related to formal institutionalization, reflecting perhaps the positive role that business groups in Japan play in communicating information concerning institutionalization of environmental objectives through formal policies. The coefficient for ADVERTISING was positive, but insignificant. Ž Ž . . Table I , which means the degree to which environmental commitments are actually attended to in firm decision making and are reflected in changes in practices, was negatively significantly related to 14 To control for potential correlation between error terms of Formal Policy and Policy Integration Ž . models, we estimated them as a system seemingly unrelated regression . This does not change our results significantly 15 Ž . All models 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 are significant at a 0.5% level. The likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients are zero in each model. Likelihood ratio tests also reject both the hypothesis that the coefficients of industry dummies are zero at a 5% level and the hypothesis that the coefficients of all eight organizational factors are zero at a 5% level. Table III shows three 2 = 2 tables of predictions by hits and misses for each of the three probit models used. A naive prediction rule which Ž . always predicts the probit dependent variable to be zero since we have more zeros than ones provides Ž . Ž . Ž . correct predictions 68.4% of the time. Our probit models 2-1 , 2-2 , and 2-3 provide more correcẗ predictions, 85.0, 87.6, and 85.0%, respectively, than the naive prediction rule. 16 
POLICY INTEGRATION Model 1-3 in
Ž .
Ž . Models 4-1 and 4-2 are both significant at a 0.5% level. A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the duration time analysis coefficients in each of these models are zero. A likelihood ratio test also rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of all eight organizational factors are zero at a Ž . Ž . 5% level. Equations 4-1 and 4-2 include dummies for high polluting and low polluting industries instead of the individual industry dummies. The original 15 industries were classified into heavily, intermediate and low polluting industry groups based on each industry's pollution and energy intensities. Pollution and energy intensities for each industry were calculated as the ratios between the emissions for carbon dioxide, sulfur and SOx and energy consumption and value added. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels. Table II was, as expected, significantly positively correlated with FIRM SIZE and negatively correlated with DEBT RATIO. There are economies of scale in certification processes and thus larger organizations accrue relatively lower costs compared to their general outlays. EMPLOYEE AGE and ISO9000 certification, reflecting learning capacity and accumulated knowledge of certification processes, respectively, were also as expected significantly correlated with ISO 14001 certification. Ž Ž . . The leaders in certification Model 4-1 in Table IV were exporters, not domestically oriented firms. This may reflect the fact that environmental values Ž have been internalized earlier by customers and consumers in foreign markets e.g., . Europe than by Japanese customers and consumers. Furthermore, the impact of these values is far more pronounced in European markets. While EXPORT RATIO was significantly positively related to shorter time to certification, no significant association was found between time to certification and AD-Ž VERTISING Note that a positive coefficient means a higher probability of . certification and thus a shorter time to certification. Lower relative costs of certification associated with FIRM SIZE, EMPLOYEE AGE, and ISO9000 certification also explain earlier certification. DEBT RATIO was significantly negatively associated with longer elapsed time to certification. Note. Numbers under coefficients are t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels.
Utility Maximization Based Models
In these models, in addition to independent variables representing costs and benefits of different facets of environmental commitment, variables which represent values, attitudes and perceptions of executives are introduced to explain the level of such commitments. The level of integration of environmental policies into general corporate policies Ž Ž . . and practices Model 1-4 , as expected, was correlated significantly negatively with DEBT RATIO and positively with CONTROLLABILITY and RESPONSI-BILITY. Firms with executives who feel that the firm can control its impact on the environment and who feel that they have personal responsibility to ensure that their firms protect the environment are more likely to see the pursuit of environmental objectives as a regular part of their business. Ž Ž . . As expected, the probability of ISO 14001 certification Model 2-2 is associated positively with FIRM SIZE, ADVERTISING, and ISO9000 certification and negatively with the EMPLOYEE AGE and DEBT RATIO when sectoral factors are controlled. Although our interpretation of the sign of firm size is that larger firms are more endowed with resources to seek ISO certifications and that they enjoy economies of scale in implementing certification, we cannot exclude the possibility that the positive sign of firm size merely reflects a larger number of Ž plants in larger firms, compared to smaller firms. We did not control the number . of each firm's plants in our regressions since the data are not available. The positive effect of advertising intensity on the probability of an ISO certification is w x consistent with the findings of Arora and Cason 3 that advertising affects positively the probability of participating in a voluntary 33r50 program. EXPORT RATIO is not significant when industry dummies are included in Model Ž . 2-2 but when industry dummies are excluded, export ratio becomes positive and Ž Ž . . significant Model 2-3 . This means that industry dummies absorb the positive impacts of exporting on ISO certification, implying that export-oriented industries as a whole are more oriented to ISO certification. This is consistent with the generally accepted observation that Japanese exporters were forced to seek ISO certifications to be able to remain in the EU market. This does not exclude, however, alternative interpretations for the positive role export ratio plays in ISO 17 Since we have used executives' ratings in our models to represent perception of executives in their firms, we have estimated all models using as control variables the individual characteristics of the Ž . respondent e.g., age, role in the organization . Using the control variables had no significant impact on the results. For simplicity we report the results without these control variables.
certification. For example, export-oriented industries such as electronics, auto, and machinery have more progressive and globally more competitive firms with proenvironment policies than industries in noncompetitive, locally based sectors such as the chemicals, paper, and pulp and energy sectors. 18 Another important finding in our probit regressions is that firms' high debt Ž Ž . Ž . . ratios deter their effort to obtain ISO certification Models 2-2 and 2-3 . Finally we note that the importance of firm-specific variables in our probit estimation is w x consistent with DeCanio and Watkins 5 who estimated logit models for firms' decisions whether to participate in EPA's voluntary Green Lights program. Ž Ž . Ž . . One puzzling finding is that in both models Models 2-2 and 2-3 R & D variables have negative coefficients. On the surface this result tends to contradict the idea that modern innovative firms are more likely to be greener. Further Ž . examination of the data, however, revealed a significant positive negative rela-Ž . tionship between R & D intensity and membership in the low high polluting industries. 19 Clean industries do not have the same pressures to demonstrate their greenness and justify their legitimacy as those considered to be in high polluting sectors.
Personal responsibility felt by executives to ensure that their organizations Ž . protected the environment RESPONSIBILITY was the most significant attitudinal variable explaining certification. Perceived pressures from civil society Ž . CIVIL SOCIETY PRESSURE also increase the probability of certification. In Ž contrast, government pressure to improve environmental performance GOVERN-. MENT PRESSURE was negatively related to certification, perhaps reflecting the fact that such pressure is higher on companies that need significant investment in environmental protection. The pressure to satisfy the government may divert efforts from voluntary actions including environmental certification.
FIRM SIZE and EXPORT RATIO are significantly positively associated with Ž Ž . . shorter time to ISO certification Model 4-2 . Larger firms have more resources to implement the new environmental management systems required for ISO 14001 certification and thus can obtain certification earlier. The costs of maintaining such systems as a share of corporate budgets are also smaller for the larger firms, so they are less likely to deter certification. Exporting firms lead domestic firms in obtaining certification. The significant positive coefficient of EXPORT RATIO reflects in part the benefits from certification that exporters have perceived in maintaining market access to Europe. They may also reflect earlier exposure to shifting public values in Europe and North America placing higher priority on protecting the environment. The average age of firm employees and firm's high debt ratios, on the other hand, are significantly negative reflecting the slower path of learning in older companies, a lower ability to innovate, and the lower priority placed on nonfinancial objectives that firms with higher short-term debt have. As expected, firms with executives who take personal responsibility to ensure that they protect the environment tend to lead in the certification process. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Firms' responses to environmental issues are an important ingredient of global environmental management. Significant empirical research has been done on the behavior of U.S. firms. Despite their importance in the global market, little empirical research exists analyzing Japanese manufacturers' responses to environmental issues. In this paper we have presented empirical estimates of the impacts of various determinants of the levels of commitment of Japanese manufacturing firms in various dimensions of their environmental protection behavior.
Our analysis suggests that while the costs and benefits of voluntary actions to enhance and protect the environment and the capacity to act are significant determinants of environmental commitments, so are the environmental values, beliefs, and attitudes of key managers. The comparison of profit maximization and utility maximization models estimated shows that recognizing organizational agency relationships by incorporating into the traditional models based on profit maximization, variables which affect the utility of managers, increases the explanatory powers of the models significantly.
The results provide also some new insights about the environmental behavior of Ž Japanese firms. We find that firms' intangible assets variables ADVERTISING . and R & D which play an important role in U.S. firms' environmental management are found to be important in only some aspects of Japanese firms' environmental management processes. This may provide some partial empirical support to the argument that most Japanese manufacturers have not institutionalized environmental issue management to the same degree as their European and American counterparts despite what appears to be successful coping with the energy conservation issues in the 1970s and 1980s.
In the 1970s and 1980s the driving force was economic survival in face of energy supply insecurity, and the environmental benefits were byproducts. In the 1990s very lax public opinion and weak civil society relegated environmental issues to a low priority status. Thus Japanese firms, despite their technical capabilities, have little reason to invest managerial resources in articulating and implementing environmental policies. However, the pressures of market access especially to Europe have increased since 1996 and have led to a reversal in this situation for at least a segment of these firms.
Japanese certification rates of ISO 14001 are found to be significantly affected by firm size, the average age of firm employees, export ratio, and debt ratio.
Ž . Japanese corporate group keiretsu related variables were found to be positive and significant only in firms' institutionalization of environmental objectives through formal policies. It is possible that keiretsu information exchanges encourage some keiretsu firms to react positively toward investing in the environment while encouraging others to avoid complying with environmental requirements. 20 If this is the case, what we observe may be positive and negative keiretsu effects canceling each other.
The findings of this paper have some implications for environmental policy makers in both the private and the public sectors. First, we have found some evidence, as in previous studies, that polluting industries are more receptive to voluntary environmental programs than less-polluting industries. 21 Policy makers need to formulate policies based on how such industry effects interact with the levels of firm efforts and firms' intangible assets. Second, we found advertising intensity to have only limited effects on firms' environmental responses. This may suggest that Japanese producers of consumer products experienced little market pressure to incorporate green strategies.
One of the main objectives of this paper is to identify the determinants of Japanese firms' managerial responses to environmental issues. How environmental firm performance is affected by adoption of alternative environmental management systems is an important subject for future research. Indeed, Boiral and Sala w x 4 raise a question about whether or not ISO 14001 can really be an effective tool to improve firms' environmental performance rather than just another ''management gadget.'' Considering the amount of resources poured into ISO 14001 certifications in Japan as well as the rest of the world, this question is too important to be left unanswered. Data which would allow researchers to undertake such a study are still lacking in Japan. This situation may be changing with a bill w x recently passed through the Japanese parliament 37, 38, 42 . This bill would set up a system of pollutant release and transfer registries. Such a system with its associated databases would allow researchers to collect more accurate data on firms' responses and environmental performance. 
APPENDIX B: MODELS
For the purposes of this paper we consider firms choosing among various organizational forms regarding their environmental responses given their investment and other management decisions in the past. We consider two types of decision models. In the first type we assume that environmental responses are determined by maximizing firm profits which are assumed to depend on the firm's environmental responses conditional on its past production decisions. In the second type we assume that a firm's environmental responses are determined by the firm's manager who maximizes her utility function which is a function of the firm's profits from operations as well as the cost of environmental response and the intrinsic value the manager receives from her firm's environmentally friendly Ž w behavior. This model is similar in spirit to the agency model of the firm e.g. 8, 16, x. 41 in which firms' managers may have management goals which may be different from those of their shareholders. 1-1 , 1-2 , 1-3 , 1-4 We define the following:
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Deri¨ation of Our OLS Model Specifications
: firm i's profit given its environmental responses with conditional revenue conditional on X with respect to FP and PI as follows:
Assuming that FP, PI ¬ X is concave in FP and PI, we solve this maximization problem and obtain reduced form equations for FP and PI for some functions
Or in regression form,
where and are equation error terms.
i i
In our estimation, we have used linearized versions of the above specifications.
Ž . Ž Ž . Ž .. II Managers' utility maximization problem at firm i Models 1-2 and 1-4 . We assume here that firm i's manager maximizes her utility function Ui conditional on X and Y with respect to FP and PI as follows:
Ž . Assuming u r, c, v is concave in its arguments, we solve this maximization problem and obtain reduced form expressions for FP and PI ,
Ž .
for some functions f and g, or in regression forms,
where and ␥ are equation error terms. 1-1 , 1-2 , 1-3 , and 1-4 are given in Table I . 2-1 , 2-1 , 2-2 , 2-2 , 2-3 , and 2-3 Ž . Ž X . Our probit Models 2-1 and 2-1 are based on managers' profit maximization, Ž X . Ž . Ž X . Ž X . while Models 2-2 , 2-2 , 2-3 , and 2-3 are based on firms' utility maximization. These are explained below in turn.
Deri¨ation of Probit Models
Ž .
Ž . Ž . III Probit Models 2-1 , 2-1' .
The decision rule for these models is that firm i maximizes its profit with respect to its choice on ISO certification as follows.
If B X y I X q F 0, Ž . Ž . In our estimation we use the following linearized function for the expression
where X is a column vector of firm i variables defined above and ␤ is a column and our probit models imply that
x i w x where ⌽ . denotes the distribution function for a standard normal random variable.
Ž . Ž X . Ž . Ž X . IV Probit Models 2-2 , 2-2 , 2-3 , and 2-3 .
We describe the utility that firm i's manager derives from obtaining an ISO 14001 certification as follows: Ž .
IVb
In our estimation we use the following linearized function for the expression
where X and Y are column vectors of firm i variables defined above. ␤ and ␤ 
and our probit models imply that
Our probit estimation results are presented in Table II .
Deri¨ation of Duration Models 4-1 , 4-1 , 4-2 , and 4-2
In formulating our duration models we make the following standard assumption that firms make a decision on ISO certifications every time period. Since our measurement unit of time is a month, it is assumed here that firms make decisions Ž on ISO certifications according to the decision rules discussed above IIId and . IVd . Our empirical specifications, however, are based on the Cox proportional hazard model which specifies our conditional probabilities as follows.
Ž .
Ž . Ž X . V Duration Models 4-1 , 4-1 .
In these models firm i's profit maximization determines firm i's duration until its ISO certification. The conditional probability is given by Prob ISO DUMMY s 1 in month t Ž i ¬ firm i has not been certified up to month t y 1.
Ž . where h t is the base hazard function.
In these models firm i's manager's utility maximization determines firm i's duration until its ISO certification. The conditional probability is given by Prob ISO DUMMY s 1 in month t Ž i ¬ firm i has not been certified up to month t y 1.
Our estimated duration models are presented in Table IV . Government has set some pollutionrproduction standards, y0.074 0.706 so we have to make sure that we do not violate them Newspapers and TV have created a lot of concern about 0.688 0.127 environmental issues, and this has put pressure on our company to improve our environmental performance My company's labor union has influenced our environmental 0.736 y0.078 practices A pollution incident, if reported by the public media, could 0.070 0.710 ruin our corporate image and market, so we must pay full attention to such issues before they become a public concern My company is subject to a lot of governmental regulation 0. 
APPENDIX C: RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS
